I examine the impact of the Great Depression on marriage outcomes and find that marriage rates and local economic conditions are positively correlated. Specifically, poor labor market opportunities for men negatively impact marriage. Conversely, there is some evidence that poor female labor markets actually increase marriage in the period. While the Great Depression did lower marriage rates, the effect was not long-lasting: marriages were delayed, not denied. The primary long-run effect of the downturn on marriage was stability: marriages formed in tough economic times were more likely to survive compared to matches made in more prosperous time periods.
Introduction
The Great Depression was a cataclysmic event in U.S. history. The downturn rippled through all aspects of society, including the institution of marriage: marriage rates fell by 20 percent from 1929 to 1933. This paper examines whether the economic collapse actually caused the lower levels of marriage or whether the decline in marriage rates was an unrelated trend.
The evidence suggests that it was the former: marriage propensities and GDP are positively correlated throughout the time period and at different levels of geographic aggregation. The relationship is robust to controlling for other variables, including place and time fixed effects. During the tumultuous 1930s, marriage rates fell most in places where the Depression hit hardest, and marriage rates recovered where the economy rebounded. Economic conditions specifically linked to the suitability of males for marriage are the strongest predictors of women's marriage probabilities. In addition to the immediate impact of the downturn on marriage, the Great Depression had a long-term effect on the marriages made in the time period. Marriages formed in poor economic times were more likely to survive than marriages made in more affluent periods, suggesting that individuals who married in lean economic periods were perhaps better matched or their initial exposure to hardship during their courtship forged strong bonds.
Through what channel does the economy affect marriage? In the Becker model of marriage (Becker 1981) , the gains to marriage come through specialization, where women specialize in home production and men specialize in market production. 1 In the Becker model, single women marry if the gains to marriage are greater than their outside option (current income).
Economic downturns may then decrease the marriage rate by lowering male employment rates and thus reducing the number of marriageable men (men able to specialize in the market production). However, economic downturns may actually increase the marriage rate if they decrease the value of the outside option: employment prospects for single women. Therefore, when single women's employment is significant (as was the case in the 1930s (Goldin 1990 )), the effect of the economy on marriage could be ambiguous. I show that labor markets in the 1930s exhibit the predicted effects on marriage: robust male labor markets have a positive effect while robust female labor markets have a negative one. Overall, the male labor market effect dominates and a positive correlation between marriage and the economy is observed.
Several scholars have examined the relationship between economic conditions and marriage. Much of the work has focused on the late twentieth century. Francine Blau, Lawrence
Kahn, and Jane Waldfogel (2000) and Robert Wood (1995) use microlevel data on individuals to estimate the extent to which deteriorating labor market opportunities can explain the retreat from marriage observed among lower income groups. Other research has highlighted the role of female labor conditions (Bitler et al. 2004 ) and male relative income (Watson and McLanahan 2010 and Loughran 2002) . Historically, there is ample evidence that the economy affected marriage. Robust early colonial economies and economic booms and busts of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century have been related to both the 1 In many ways, the evolution of the institution of marriage has rendered the Becker model obsolete. The trends in married women's labor force participation, child-bearing and age at first marriage have made consumption complementarities much more important in marriage than specialization. (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007) However, within the context of the 1930s, marriage was more traditional. The majority of women left the labor force upon marriage and specialized in home production. Thus, the Becker model will still be applicable in the period.
propensity to marry and age at marriage. (Haines, 1996; Fitch and Ruggles, 2000; Cvrcek 2010 ) This paper adds to the existing literature by examining factors that have concerned scholars of recent marriage trends in the context of the 1930s.
I exploit the variation in economic conditions engendered by the Great Depression to estimate the effect of local GDP on the probability of marriage for young women and men.
Specifically, I perform three analyses dictated by geographic and temporal constraints. State income data and manufacturing data are available for the period from 1920 to 1939; thus, at the state level I am able to estimate the effect of state income and earnings variation on individuals' marriage decisions throughout the entire Depression (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) ) and the interwar period (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) In the long run, the Great Depression had little impact on marriage rates; however, it did affect the quality of matches. Marriage rates fell at the onset of the Depression but recovered quickly when the economy rebounded. The result was that marriages were delayed rather than denied. Members of the cohort who came of age in the Great Depression were no more likely to never marry than members of subsequent or preceding cohorts. The longrun effect of the Great Depression was on marriage stability; couples married during the economic doldrums were less likely to divorce. These couples may have been matched well on qualities other than short-term economic prospects and therefore their marriages were less susceptible to divorce in the long term. Another possible explanation is that the exposure to the Depression during their initial years of courtship forged a strong bond that enabled couples to weather subsequent hardship.
Trends
In order to place the Depression era in context, I report the long-run trends in GDP and marriage rates in the United States. Prior to 1960, there was a positive relationship between GDP and marriage rates at the national level. Figure 1 , a scatter plot of marriage rates and women aging into to the marriage pool were similar to pre-Depression marriage rates). Thus, the aggregate trends suggest that the impact of the economic downturn on marriage rates was not permanent.
Qualitative primary sources echo the trends observed at the national level: women postponed marriage during the downturn. They delayed for a number reasons related to local economic conditions. Women in Chicago families interviewed by Ruth Cavan and Katherine Ranck explained, "The boys have no jobs," and "I want a man with a job." 5 A mother, wary of losing her working daughter's income, relayed, "I hope she will not marry for two years as the family needs her help." Falling incomes in general also took their toll on marriage.
A woman in the Chicago study has a boyfriend, but they must delay marriage until "he can support her." Men in the sample complain about barely being able to cover their own Oakland men had difficulty finding jobs and affording courtships.
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Were the marriages formed in the Great Depression different than those formed in times of prosperity on any other dimension? Long-run divorce trends suggest marriages forged in the hard times of the Great Depression were less likely to be dissolved than marriages began in other time periods. Figure 3 shows z denotes a measure of quality. A match is accepted if the potential spouse has a z value greater than an individual's reservation value, z * . Once a match is accepted, the couple exits the marriage market, and divorce is not an option. Given the low rates of divorce in the period, this assumption is not as unrealistic as it might be in more recent periods. 8 Empirically, this framework suggests one should observe relationships between the sex ratio and marriage, and between local GDP and marriage. An increase in sex ratio (total men/total women) affects the propensity to marry by lowering α for men and increasing α for women.
GDP should increase marriage rates because higher GDP is associated with higher male earnings/employment and is thus a proxy for the quality of males. In areas with higher GDP, the distribution of male quality F (z) will be shifted upward and there will be more men above the women's reservation value of z * . It is through this mechanism that lower GDP will induce fewer marriages. Assume that a spouse is accepted when z, where z = i + q, is greater than the reservation value z * , and z * is time invariant. Thus, in periods of economic hardship when F (i) is shifted downward, the marriages observed will consist, on average, of husbands with higher q values than husbands observed during prosperous times. If q is associated with marriage longevity, then marriages formed during economic hardship should last longer on average, that is, be less susceptible to divorce, than those formed during economic prosperity. women because the majority of the decennial censuses contain marriage data only for women, and because the conceptual framework suggests women have agency in the decision to marry.
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In the constructed data, a woman's first observation occurs in the year she turns 17. Then there is an observation for each subsequent year until the woman marries or turns 28. I chose the age limits of 17 to 28 because over 80 percent of first marriages occur in those years, and the decision-making process for choosing a spouse should be consistent across those ages. 10 Results are robust to selecting different age ranges.
I then merge this constructed panel data with economic conditions in each year for which data is available.
The constructed retrospective marriage histories have several advantages over conventional state counts of marriages. Firstly, the retrospective marriage histories are more detailed because they are observed at the individual level. This allows me to control for important confounding factors in the marriage decision, such as race, education level, and age. Secondly, the retrospective marriage histories are potentially more accurate than the raw marriage rates that are based on marriage license data. In a recent study, Rebecca 
Where M ijt is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i in state j was married in year t, α j is a state fixed effect, year t is a year fixed effect, x i is a vector of individual characteristics that may impact the marriage decision (includes: age, age squared, race, urban status, census year and education (where available)), and y jt is a vector of state economic variables in year t. The state fixed effect controls for any time invariant differences between states in their marriage propensity, while the year fixed effect controls for any nationwide time trends. The vector of the coefficients of interest γ, the effects of a state's economic characteristics on the marriage probability, is identified by economic changes within a state over time. Almost 95 percent of the variation in state incomes can be accounted for by year and state fixed effects; therefore, I estimate the equation without year fixed effects as well. Table 1 , which reports the results of estimating equation (1), shows that state economic conditions had a positive effect on a woman's probability of marriage. The baseline estimate from column (1) suggests that a 10 percent increase in state income would raise a women's probability of marriage by 0.7 percentage points, a 7 percent increase in the probability of marriage in a given year. In my preferred specification with year fixed effects, column (2), 15 I limit the sample to women because the 1940 census did not ask men about their age at first marriage.
the estimated coefficient on income per capita is lowered to 0.0348 but remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In columns (3)-(4) real manufacturing earnings are added to the specification. The estimated effect of state income remains statistically significant at conventional levels. However, log average manufacturing earnings exhibits a larger impact on the marriage probability. Average manufacturing earnings is perhaps a better predictor for the probability of marriage than real per capita income because, while real per capita income reflects the health of the overall economy, manufacturing earnings are an indicator of the prospects and marriageability of young men. The estimated effect of manufacturing earnings in column (4) suggests a 10 percent increase would increase the probability of marriage by 0.2 percentage points, a 2 percent increase (though the coefficient is not statistically distinguishable from zero at conventional levels). In columns (5) and (6) State Economic Area Level Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (1) 
SEA Level 1940
In this section, I examine the effect of local economic conditions in 1940 on the probability an individual had married in the previous five years. For the year 1940, there exist many more local economic variables than I have used in the preceding sections, where I was limited to variables available on a semi-annual basis. 16 Table 3 , shows the estimated effect of various 16 It should be noted that while an analysis of outcomes in 1940 allows me to include many more economic factors than in previous analyses, for multiple reasons, estimates from the stock of marriages in a single year might be more prone to biases than estimates from semi-annual analyses. Firstly, several scholars have found that married men are more productive than single that WPA spending per capita is negatively associated with the probability of marriage. It is not necessarily the case that there is a causal link between WPA spending and marriage.
The coefficient on the effect of male unemployment becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero when WPA spending is included, while all the other estimated coefficients are unchanged. Thus WPA spending may be a proxy for male unemployment in a given SEA, and this association explains the negative observed relationship between spending and marriage. Table 4 shows the results of regressions where the dependent variable is age difference between spouses (column (1) and (2)) or education years difference between spouses (columns (3) and (4)). I report estimates for the state (column (1) and (3)) and SEA level (columns (2) and (4)). At the SEA level, lowered local retail sales are associated with a smaller age gap between husband and wife.
The estimate implies a 25 percent drop in retail sales would lower the age gap between spouses by 3.8 months. The estimate is only marginally statistically significant though, and no effect is found at the state level. No statistically significant effects are found on the education difference between spouses. I also find no impact on inter-racial marriage or the propensity of natives to marry foreign borns (results not shown). The Great Depression certainly affected marriage rates; however, the results in table 4 suggest that it did not affect the fundamentals of the marriage market. Whether they married in the depths of the depression or during the recovery, individuals married similar spouses in terms of observables (age, race, education).
Low Migration Sample
Results using samples where persons are placed with a high degree of accuracy show that migration bias is not driving the observed positive relationship between economic conditions and the probability of marriage. Table 5 , columns (1) and (2), shows the results of estimating equation (1) (1) and (2), the coefficients based on this low migration sample are larger than their corresponding coefficients from the estimation based on the entire sample (table 1, columns (2) and (6)). In columns (5) and (6) Long-Run Impact of the Great Depression on Marriage
In this section, I examine the impact of the Great Depression on marriage in the subsequent decades. Thus far, I have focused on the effects of the economy on marriage during the 1920s and 1930s. I have provided evidence that the economic downturn negatively impacted marriage rates. However, the data does not suggest that this effect was long lasting, marriage rates quickly recovered, and women who came of age during the downturn were no more likely 18 Using marriage rates calculated from 1940 census retrospective marriage histories.
to never marry than women from other cohorts. The Great Depression did not give rise to a generation of lifelong bachelors and spinsters, but were there other long-term effects of the Great Depression on marriage? The conceptual framework outlined previously indicates that couples that marry during downturns might be better matched on other aspects outside of the income prospects of the male. Another possibility is that courtship during tough economic periods creates strong bonds. In either case, marriages formed in times of economic hardship would be less susceptible to divorce than other marriages. 
Where D ijc is a first marriage failure dummy variable for individual i in state j of the marriage year cohort c. It takes value 1 if the person observed in 1960/70 reports being separated or divorced or if they currently are in their second or more marriage and their first marriage did not end due to death. 20 Income jc is the variable of interest: it is the average log 19 Because both the marriage and birth quarters are known, the marriage probability weighting scheme used for previous censuses is not necessary. 20 For individuals in 1960 who marry more than once, I cannot ascertain whether the first marriage ended in divorce or death.
Differential mortality by marriage year and state of residence would then bias any estimated effect found. Given the relative youth of the sample (average age 50.1) and the low mortality rates (3-6 per 1000) of adults in the interwar period (source: U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1936), any bias from differential mortality is likely to be negligible. Furthermore, David Stuckler and coauthors (2010) find that economic shocks during the Great Depression did not impact mortality rates; thus variation in mortality will not be correlated with changes in real income per capita. The inclusion of birth year fixed effects accounts for real per capita income in an individuals state for the three years prior to their marriage year.
I include birth year fixed effects to account for any difference in divorce across age groups, for instance if younger persons have less stigma associated with divorce. I also include state fixed effects to account for any differences in the acceptance/prevalence of divorce across states. The vector, x i , contains individual characteristics that may influence the failure of an individuals marriage: race, age at first marriage, and education. (1)- (3) display the effects when the estimation is limited to men, and columns (4)- (6) show the results for the women. The estimates suggest that marrying in a prosperous period increases the probability that the marriage will end. (3) and (6), I add marriage year fixed effects. Marriage year fixed effects will account for any systematic prevalence of divorce between marriage years.
They will also control for any confounding factors from a given marriage year that may be influencing divorce, for instance, if persons married in 1940 were more likely to have served in WWII and that increased the probability of divorce. However, including this fixed effect perhaps leads to over-identification, because much of the variation in economic conditions occurs across marriage years. Furthermore, a portion of the effect of interest is the difference any differential mortality due to WWII. And as an additional test, I performed the estimation on a sample of persons who were married only once (their marriage was either intact or they reported being separated/divorced), and change in the estimated coefficients is not statistically significant.
between being married in boom years versus bust years; controlling for marriage year will remove some of the relevant variation in the variable of interest. With these caveats noted,
columns (3) and (6) 
